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Comments
UNRECORDED TRUST RECEIPTs IN MISSOURI
The recent decision of the Kansas City Court of Appeals in Commercial Credit
Co. v. Interstate Securities Co.,' sustaining the validity of a trust receipt without
recordation as against a mortgagee provokes consideration as to whether the validity
of the unrecorded trust receipt is finally and definitely settled in Missouri.
1. 197 S.W. (2d) 1000 (Mo. App. 1946).
(189) 1
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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Although the trust receipt is one of the most recent devices developed to offer
purchase-money security,2 it is no longer a novelty to the attorney, the courts, or
to ,; great many businessmen. The topic has been well-explored in law reviews
and textbooks and has been the subject of frequent annotations to the extent that
little original analysis or collation of cases is practical.3 However, a rational
approach to the Missouri cases can hardly be made without some background as
a basis.
TRIPARTITE TRUST RECEIPTS
The trust receipt first developed in th6 import field.4 It Was utilized so that
a bank could advance credit to an importer, permitting the importer to have a
limited freedom with the imported merchandise and at the same time retain in the
lending bank a security interest in the imported items themselves without the
necessity for public record of that- interest. The trust receipt is spawned from
that need for credit on the one hand and the need for security other than the
personal liability of the borrower on the other.5
This import device was soon transplanted into the domestic financing of pur-
chases of goods, but, as a glance at the digests will reveal, the trust receipt came
into its own in domestic financing when automobile manufacturers adapted it to
the financing of retail automobile agencies in the purchase of automobiles.0 The
basic pattern is the same as that used in import financing. The conspicuous differ-
ence lies not in legal theory or practice, but in the fact that the position of the
2. Barry v. Boninger, 46 Md. 59 (1876), is regarded as the first case to use
the term "trust receipt," although earlier cases had dealt with transactions of
the same nature. For a historical treatment of the early cases, as well as a good dis-
cussion of the trust receipt as a security device, see Frederick, The Trust Receipt
as Security (1922) 22 COL. L. REV. 546. For an interesting account of a Grecian
commercial practice strikingly similar to the modern trust receipt transaction,
see Zane, A Modern Instance of Zenothemis v. Demon (1925) 23 MICH. L. REv. 339.
3. 53 Am. JuR., Trust Receipts, p. 961-971; 7 BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF
AUTOMOBILE LAw (1935) § 111, 112 p. 341-372; 1 WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924)
§§ 338a and 338b; Frederick, The Trust Receipt as Security (1922) 22 COL. L. REV.
546; Hanna, Trust Receipts (1929) 29 COL. L. REV. 545; Hanna, Trust Receipts
(1931) 19 CALIF. L. REV. 257; Void, Trust Receipt -Security in the Financing of
Sales (1930) 15 CORN. L. Q 543; Williston, The Progress of the Law: Sales 1919-
1920 (1920) 34 HAv. L. REV. 741; Notes (1929) 14 CORN. L. Q. 388, (1929)
7 N.Y.U.L. Q. 197, (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 602, (1937) 12 WASH. L. REV. 301, (1933)
17 MINN. L. REV. 790; Notes (1923) 25 A.L.R. 332 (1927) 49 A.L.R. 282, (1936)
101 A.L.R. 453.
4. For an example of an import transaction with samples of the language
employed in the instruments, see In re Cattus, 183 Fed. 733 (C.C.A. 2d, 1912);
In re K. Marks & Co., 222 Fed. 52 (C.C.A. 2d, 1915).
5. Century Throwing Co. v. Muller, 197 Fed. 252 (C.C.A. 3d, 1912). At
page 258 the court says, "We can readily understand how the business of foreign
importation by merchants, and especially by manufacturers, is facilitated and en-
larged by making available to those of small means the credit of banking capital.
The business of importation is thus extended, by not being confined to those
concerns having large capital and established foreign credit." This statement is
typical of many to be found in trust receipt cases.
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lending bank, so important in the import field, has been assumed by large financing
companies, financing on a nationwide basis the purchase of automobiles by retail
agencies.
The business necessities which called the trust receipt into play in this aspect
may be described thusly: A manufacturer has the automobiles that he wants to
sell and desires to reach the widest market possible. The local retailer wants to
buy, but too few can afford to pay for the automobiles displayed on the showroom
floor. Without doubt the manufacturer in most instances has the financial resources
to sell the cars to its dealers on credit, but its business is manufacturing cars, and
it is not eager to enter the credit field, which has its own host of problems and
techniques and requires a different type, of organization. As a consequence large
credit agencies entered the field to finance these local automobile dealers. A few
of the larger companies are familiar to all-General Motors Acceptance Corpora-
tion, Commercial Credit Corporation, Universal Credit Corporation, and many
others. These financing agencies, of course, have more than an accidental tie-up
with particular automobile manufacturers.
The financing agency needs security for the money or credit advanced, yet
at the same time the local dealer must be given at least a limited possession of
the cars in order to make sales with which to repay the money so loaned. The
pledge could not be utilized because, with minor exceptions, the pledgee's security
is dependent upon continued possession by the pledgee.7 The chattel mortgage,
the mortgagor retaining possession, was almost universally subject to recording
requirements s and sometimes subject to restrictions on foreclosure. The condi-
tional sale was little better in those jurisdictions requiring conditional sale con-
tracts to be recorded,9 and especially where, as in Missouri, there exist further
limitations on repossession by the conditional vendor.10 It was the failure of the
older security devices to meet the needs of commercial credit that conceived and
gave birth to the trust receipt in the import field and suggested its use, which has
become so popular and so widespread, in the domestic field.
To take a concrete example of a trust receipt transaction for the purpose of
this discussion, let us assume the case of a retailer (R) operating a retail auto-
mobile sales agency in Columbia, Missouri. R does the greater part of his business
on a trust receipt basis, whereby a finance company (F) has contracted to furnish
the capital. R orders five cars from the manufacturer (M) in Detroit. M ships the
cars by carrier to Columbia, taking from the carrier an order bill of lading. M sends
the bill of lading with sight draft attached (sometimes also a bill of sale) to F F
pays the draft.1" When the cars arrive in Columbia, R is notified and he goes to F
7. For a comment on the pledge analysis in trust receipt transactions, see
Hanna, Trust Receipts, 29 COL. L. REv. 545 (1929).
8. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 3486.
9. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 3515.
10. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 3516.
11. Inasmuch as these large financing companies cannot maintain a local
office in each community, i local bank is customarily engaged as agent to pay the
draft with money furnished by the financing agency, to take the dealer's trust
3
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for the bill of lading, so that he may take possession of the cars from the carrier.
The usual practice is for R to pay 15-20 per cent of the purchase price to F and
to execute to F a note for the balance. F gives the bill of lading to R and
simultaneously R executes a trust receipt to F. A number of variations of this ar-
rangement are currently employed, but they have no effect on the ultimate validity
of the transaction, so long as the source of F's title is carefully observed, which
cardinal fact will be more fully discussed below.
The terms of the trust receipt may vary, but the usual provisions are to the effect
that R takes the bill of lading in trust for F to take possession of the cars, to take
the cars from the freight depot and store them in R's place of business, to keep
the cars brand new, not to operate them for demonstration purposes, and to return
them to the finance company upon demand for any reason, R further agrees that
he assumes the risk of any loss or damage to the cars, stores them at his own
expense, agrees to pay and discharge all taxes, etc., with respect to the cars. R fur-
ther agrees that he will not sell, loan, deliver, pledge, mortgage, or otherwise
dispose of the cars to any person until payment of the purchase price has been
made to F. R may be authorized to sell the cars for not less than a stated amount
or that due on the note, or he may be authorized to sell only after receiving formal
permission from F. If authorized to sell, he is required to hold the proceeds in trust
for F separate and apart from R's other funds and to remit immediately or period-
ically to F.12
The above hypothetical case is descriptive of a tripartite or so-called "true"
trust receipt transaction. It is to be noted that there are three parties involved:
the initial owner (the manufacturer), the financing agency, and the local retail dealer,
who is borrowing the money and who executes the trust receipt. Title moves from
the initial owner to the financing agency by way of the bill of lading. Title was
not in the retail dealer when he executed the trust receipt. Actually, of course, the
bill of lading passes into the hands of the retail dealer in order for him to obtain
possession of the cars from the carrier.' 3 And true it is that while the dealer has
the bill of lading in his possession there is a logical inconsistency between the terms
of the trust receipt which provide that the title "remains" or "continues" in the
financing agency and the reality of the transaction in that the dealer does have the
receipt, to deliver the order bill to the dealer and to accept payment and effect
release to the trust receipt when the cars have been sold. As to whether this
modification of the arrangement will change the tripartite nature of the trans-
action, see In re Cullen, 282 Fed. 902 (D. Md. 1922); Matter of Lee, 6 Am. B.R.
(n.s.) 437 (D.C. Wis. 1923). See also Void, Trust Receipt Security in Financing
of Sales, 15 CORN. L. Q. 543, 571 (1930); VOLD, SALES, § § 111, 112, p. 371 et seq.
12. Inasmuch as trust receipt cases turn on the particular facts before the
court, nearly any cited case will furnish an example of the language of the trust
receipts used in automobile financing.
13. And the dealer by negotiating the bill of lading to a holder in due course
can cut off the security interest of the financing agency, even though in so doing
he is acting wrongfully. Commercial Nat. Bank v. Canal-Louisiana Bank, 239 U.S.
520, 36 Sup. Ct. 194 (1916);' In re Richeimer, 221 Fed. 16 (C.C.A. 7th, 1915);
Roland M. Baker Co. v. Brown, 214 Mass. 196, 100 N.E. 1025 (1913).
[Vol. 12
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bill of lading. But when the bill of lading is surrendered to the carrier, it is no
longer operative and the dealer has the possession of the cars subject to the
terms of the trust receipt, title has unaccountably remained in the financing agency
or miraculously reversed to the financing agency.14
But what is important from a legal standpoint is that title moved from the
manufacturer to the financing agency without having passed into the hands of the
retail dealer. Possession rests in the dealer, but title remains in the financing agency.,
The situation is just the opposite of that which prevails with respect to a pledge.
Nor has the transaction been consummated in such a way that it could be said
that the trust receipt was a conveyance of title by way of security as is the case
with respect to a chattel mortgage or deed of trust. The arguments that it is not
a conditional sale may be summarized roughly as follows: the relation is that of
lender and borrower, not vendor-vendee; the holder of the trust receipt can repossess
at any time, whereas the conditional seller can repossess only on default; the trust
receipt does not purport to be a conditional sale.
But the recording acts represent an impinging doctrine on common law prop-
erty rights and any separation of title and possession will very naturally be subject
to close scrutiny to determine whether the particular separation of title and pos-
session is governed by the existing recording requirements. When the full force
of judicial scrutiny was leveled on trust receipt transactions, principally in the
federal courts in bankruptcy proceedings, the courts, appreciative of the adaptabil-
ity of the trust receipt to modern business needs, were astute in sustaining the valid-
ity of the trust receipt without recordation, 15 although they had some little difficulty
describing in exact terms the legal relation and interests of the parties."'
14. See VOLD, SALES, §§ 111, 112, pp. 343-355, for a systematic development
of the transaction with a discussion of the divided property interests of the parties
at the various stages of the transaction.
15. Charavay and Bodvin v. York Silk Mfg. Co., 170 Fed. 819 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1909);.In re Cattus, 183 Fed. 733 (C.C.A. 2d, 1910); Century Throwing Co. v.
Muller, 197 Fed. 252 (C.C.A. 3d, 1912); In re Dunlap Carpet Co., 206 Fed. 726
(E.D. Pa. 1913), aff'd in Assets Realization Co. v. Sovereign Bank of Canada,
210 Fed. 252 (C.C.A. 3d, 1914); In re K. Marks & Co. 222 Fed. 52 (C.C.A. 2d,
1915); In re James, Inc. 30 F.(2d) 555 (C.C.A. 2d, 1929); Hamilton Nat. Bank v.
McCallum, 58 F. (2d) 912 (C.C.A. 6th, 1932), cert. denied 53 Sup. Ct. 1919 (1932);
In re Bell Motor Co., Craig v. Industrial Acceptance Corp.; 45 F. (2d) 19 (C.C.A.
8th, 1930), cert. denied 283 U.S. 832, 51 Sup. Ct. 365, (1931), sub nom, Craig v.
Industrial Acceptance Corp.; In re Otto-Johnson Mercantile Co., 52 F.(2d) 678
(D.N. Mex. 1928); Moore v. Myman, 146 Mass. 60, 15 N.E. 104 (1888); People's
Nat. Bank v. Muhholland, 228 Mass. 152, 117 N.E. 46 (1917); In re Reboulin
Fils & Co., 165 Fed. 245 (D. N.J. 1908); Commercial Credit Co. v. Peak, 195
Cal. 27, 231 Pac. 340 (1924); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hupfer, 113
Neb. 228, 202 N.W. 627 (1925); Brown Brothers v. Billington, 163 Pa. 76, 29 At.
904 (1894). Professor Hanna in an article Extension of Public Recordation,
31 COL. L. Rtv. 617, 630 (1931), says, "Over the country as a whole the majority
of the decisions seem to hold that the trust receipt is not valid as a security without
filing. If, however, one considers only the decisions in the large commercial states,
it seems that the trend of authority is to support the device irrespective of public
record."
16. See the following cases as to the difficulty of precise definition of the
5
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Although the trust receipt did not purport to conform to any of the older
security devices previously known to the law, it could be distinguished from, the
chattel mortgage only in the source of the finance company's title. Hence, one
cardinal requirement was laid down by the courts: the title of the financing agency
must be derived from someone other than the one executing the trust receipt and
responsible for the satisfaction of the loan. 7 Hence, it is that only the tripartite
trust receipt transaction, an example of which has just been described, is accorded
validity by the weight of authority, while the bipartite trust receipt transactions,
to be discussed hereinafter, which have been ill-advised attempts to secure the
same advantages accorded to the tripartite transaction, have resulted in no more
security than is had from an unrecorded chattel mortgage or conditional sale.' 8
Most of the cases, sustaining the tripartite trust receipt without recording pro-
ceeded on the theory that the trust receipt did not conform, or purport to conform,
to any of the traditional security devices, and hence, being separate and distinct,
was not subject to recording statutes with respect to chattel mortgages or condi-
tional sales.' 9 These courts in effect declared the trust receipt to be sui generis.
Another line of decisions, also seeking to sustain tlhem without recordation, viewed
the relationship created by the trust receipt as being in the nature of a bailment.20
A few earlier cases, in states where conditional sale contracts did not have to
be recorded, construed them as conditional sales in order to sustain their validity
without recordation.21
Other courts, however, have taken the position that the recording laws of the
state required them to be recorded to be valid. Some took the view that they were
by their nature chattel mortgages. 2 2 Most of these decisions, it is felt, result from
relationship of the parties: In re Reboulin Fils & Co., Charavay & Bodvin v. York
Silk Mfg. Co., Century Throwing Co. v. Muller, and In re Dunlap Carpet Co.,
all cited supra note 15.
17. Notes (1923) 25 A.L.R. 332, (1927) 48 A.L.R. 282, (1936) 101 A.L.R.
453.
18. See cases cited in notes 31, 32, 33.
19. Charavay & Bodvin v. York Silk Mfg. Co., In re Cattus; In re Dunlap
Carpet Co., In re K. Marks & Co., In re James, Inc., and Hamilton Nat. Bank v.
Muhholland, all cited supra note 15; Iowa Guarantee Mortgage Corp. v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 250 N.W. 669 (S.D. 1933).
20. In re Bell Motor Co., Century Throwing Co. v. Muller, In re Otto-Johnson
Mercantile Co., Commercial Credit Co., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hupfer,
and Brown Brothers v. Billington, all cited supra note 15.
21. New Haven Wire Company cases, 57 Conn. 353, 18 At. 266 (1899).
Mershon v. Moors, 76 Wis. 502, 45 N.W. 95 (1890). See a later case to the
same effect, People's Loan & Inv. Co. v. Universal Credit Co., 75 F. (2d) 545
(C.C.A. 8th, 1935), where the court without discussion of the nature of the trust
receipt held that the finance company had title in accord with the weight of
authority, and that in Arkansas a conditional sale contract is not required to be
recorded.
22. In re Richeimer, 221 Fed. 16 (C.C.A. 7th, 1915) cert. denied 238 US.
624, 3, Sup. Ct. 662; Hagbeggar v. Skalla, 34 P. (2d) 113 (Kan. 1934); It re
Williams, C.I.T. Corporation v. Wiseman, 287 Mich. 689, 284 N.W. 609 (1939);
Bankers Corp. v. C.I.T., 258 Mich. 301, 241 N.W. 911 (1932); General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Berry, 86 N.H. 280, 167 Ad. 553 (1933); Smith v. Commercial
[Vol. 12
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broad judicial interpretation of the recording statutes, as they do not seem anymore
inclusive than elsewhere.23 Other courts just as positively took the position that
they were conditional sale contracts and thus fell within the recording statute ap-
plicable to conditional sale contracts.
24
In 1925, after a federal court decision declaring trust receipts to fall within
the Ohio conditional sale statute, the legislature of Ohio specifically excepted cer-
tain uses of the trust receipt from the operation of the conditional sale statute. It
was provided that the trust receipt should be valid and binding not only as between
the parties thereto, but as against all creditors of the signer of the trust receipt
and all persons claiming under the signer except purchasers and mortgagees in good
faith and for value; but if the financing agency would preserve its rights under the
trust receipt, it was required to file an affidavit in the county where the signer
of the trust receipt was doing business stating that the business is being financed
on a trust receipt basis with respect to a certain type of merchandise.25
The Ohio statute suggested a solution to the trust receipt problem. Uniformity
in treatment was obviously desirable, especially since so much of the domestic trust
receipt business was being done on a nationwide basis. But the time when it could
be hoped that substantial uniformity could be secured through decision was long
passed.218 With this and other considerations in mind the Commissioners on Uni-
Credit Corp., 113 N. J. Eq. 12, 165 At. 637 (Ch. 1933), aff'd on appeal, Morrow
v. Smith, 115 N. J. Eq. 310, 170 Atl. 607 (1934); General Motors Acceptance Corp.
v. Sharp Motor Sales Co., 233 Ky. 290, 25 S. W. (2d) 405 (1930); Universal Credit
Co. v. Gasow-Howard Motor Co., 73 S. W. (2d) 909 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); Uni-
versal Credit Co. v. Reiley, 171 Okla. 286, 42 P. (2d) 516 (1935); General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Seattle Association of Credit Men, 67 P. (2d) 882 (1937),
wherein the court said it was either a chattel mortgage or a conditional sale without
deciding which; Matter of Lee, 6 Am. B. R. (n. s.) 437 (Dist. Ct. Wis. 1923).
23. The Texas statute is more broadly written than the usual statute. See 10
TEXAs L. REv. 388 (1932). The Kentucky position may be explained by the fol-
lowing language of the court in General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Sharp Motor
Sales Co., supra note 22, at p. 293 of 233 Ky.: ". . . whatever may be the name
or form of transaction, when it is designed to hold personal property as mere
security for a, debt, it is regarded as a chattel mortgage."
24. In re Bettman-Johnson Co., 250 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918); General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mayberry, 195 N. C. 508, 142 S. E. 767 (1928). Gen-
eral Motors Acceptance" Corp. v. Whitely, 217 Iowa 998, 252 N. W. 779 (1934),
while not giving sufficient facts to determine whether the transaction was tripartite
or bipartite, the fact would make no differencd as the court at page 780 of 252 N. W.
says, "The most infallible test by which to determine under which class the con-
tract falls is to ascertain whether there is a promise by the purchaser to pay for the
goods delivered. If there is such a promise, then, no matter under what form the
transaction is designated, it is held to be a conditional sale and not a bailment."
25. OHIO CODE ANN. (Throckmorton, 1936) § 8568.
26. The Commissioners on Uniform Laws state in the Prefactory Note to their
Uniform Trust Receipts Act that up to 1929 the weight of authority sustained the
validity of the trust receipt, but beginning in 1930, there was a decided trend toward
refusing validity unless recordedthe refusal stemming from a dislike of the financing
agency's secret lien. While no attempt has been made to prove or disprove this
observation by a collation of all the cases, a glance at the dates of the cases cited
in note 22, supra would seem to bear this out.
7
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form Laws, with the experience under the Ohio statute before them, promulgated
in '1933, a Uniform Trust Receipts Act, which has been adopted in twenty-one
states. 27 The Uniform Act, naturally, covers only those transactions within its
terms, but its terms embrace not only the tripartite transaction under discussion,
but also include other bipartite transactions. The fundamental idea is that recorda-
tion of the individual trust receipt shall not be required, but a statement signed
by the lender and borrower is to be filed with the Secretary of State, stating that
they intend to do business on the trust receipt plan in respect to a particular type
of goods. The statement so filed is effective for one year, and may be renewed.28
One point of unanimity had, however, already been attained. Even in those
majority jurisdictions sustaining the trust receipt without recordation, a bona fide
purchaser for value without notice who had purchased in the regular course of
business from the dealer the merchandise held under trust receipt was held not to
take subject to the rights of the trust receipt holder, the decisions being based on
the grounds of apparent authority 29 in the dealer or estoppel30
BIPARTITE TRUST REcEIPTS
When the courts sustained the validity of the tripartite trust receipt, its use
was attempted in many situations which did not fit the pattern of the tripartite
transaction. When faced with these spurious uses of the trust receipt, the courts
were keen to cut through the transaction and to lay bare the actual situation with
the result that they found transactions undistinguishable from the older security
devices. These questionable uses of the trust receipt, when disclosed, gave no
greater security than would have been accorded to an unrecorded chattel mortgage
or conditional sale. There was no magic in the term "trust receipt" alone.
One such use arises where the title passes from the manufacturer or seller to
27. California, 1935; Connecticut, 1937; Idaho, 1945; Illinois, 1935; Indiana,
1935; Maryland, 1941; Massachusetts, 1936; Minnesota, 1943; Montana, 1945;
Nevada, 1941; New Hampshire, 1939; New Jersey, 1938; New York, 1934; North
Dakota, 1945; Oregon, 1935; Pennsylvania, 1941; South Dakota, 1945; Tennessee,
1937; Utah, 1945; Virginia, 1944; Washington, 1943.
28. The Uniform Act is an attempted reconciliation of the two competing
interests involved. As the Prefactory Note to the Act points out either of the two
previous base points is unfair to some interest. If the trust receipt is declared
valid without recordation, the creditors and innocent mortgagees, pledgees, etc., of
the dealer will suffer. On the other hand, if the trust receipt is declared to be
a chattel mortgage or conditional sale and thus subject to recording acts, a very
valuable credit device has been effectively hamstrung. Under the Uniform Act
the filing of the notice that a certain business is operating on a trust receipt basis
gives warning to all who might otherwise have relied on the possession of the dealer
and at the same time imposes no cumbersome proceddre of recordation and release
as to each individual trust receipt.
29. Glass v. Continental Guaranty Co., 81 Fla. 687, 88 So. 876, 25 A. L. R.
312 (1912); F. T. Banking Corp v. Gersetta Corp., 237 N. Y. 265, 142 N. E. 607,
31 A. L. R. 932 (1923); Brown Bros. & Co. v. The Win. Clark Co., 22 R. I. 36,
46 Atl. 239 (1900); Jones v. C. I. T. Trust, 64 Utah 151, 228 Pac. 896 (1924).
30. Clark v. Flynn, 120 Misc. Rep. 474, 199 N. Y. S. 583 (1923). See noets
(1923) 31 A. L. R. 937.
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the retailer instead of to the finance company, the technical requirement as to the
source of the finance company's title not being observed. Title being in the retailer,
the execution of the trust receipt operates as a conveyance of the title to the finance
company and hence the courts very rightly held that the trust receipt came within
the chattel mortgage recording acts.8 '
A second questionable use arises where, the seller ships goods to the dealer,
taking a trust receipt as security for the purchase -price. Here again the courts have
looked beyond the terminology employed and recognized the transaction as one of
conditional sale.32
Still another ill-advised use of the trust receipt arises where a bank or financing
agency lends money to the dealer, who executes a trust receipt on part of his mer-
chandise as security for the loan. This use has also generally been condemned as
nothing more than a chattel mortgage and hence not valid as against creditors or
the bankrupt dealer's trustee in bankruptcy.83
MISSOURI CASES3 4
In 1926 the first Missouri case involving the use of a trust receipt came to the
Springfield Court of Appeals in Forgan v. Bidges.35 By this time many reported
cases were in the books sustaining the validity of the financer's title in the true
tripartite trust receipt transaction and distinguishing clearly the bipartite trust
receipt. Although the bulk of the reported cases involved import transactions,
domestic use of the trust receipt in automotive financing was quite common. Al-
thougli it was the eastern commercial states that had predominated in the litiga-
tion, a good many of the middle western and other states had already taken a
positive stand with regard to trust receipts. However, there were indeed many other
jurisdictions which had not yet been called upon to consider them. This recapitula-
tion is made solely to point out that both counsel and the court had the benefit
31. In re Schuttig, 1 F. (2d) 443 (D., N. J. 1924); In re Alday Motor Co., 50
F. (2d) 228 (D. Tenn. 1930); In re Draughn & Steele Motor Co., 49 F. (2d) 636
(E. D. Ky. 1931); Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Callahan, 271 Mass. 556,
171 N. E. 8Z0 (1930); McLeod Nash Motors v. Commercial Credit Trust, 246
N. W. 17 (Minn. 1932); Commonwealth Finance Corp. v. Schutt, 97 N. J. L. 225,
116 Atl. 722 (1922); New England Auto Investment Co. v. St. Germaine, 45 R. I.
225, 121 Atl. 398 (1923).
32. In re Shiffert, 281 Fed. 284 (E. D. Pa. 1922); White v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 2 F. Supp. 406 (E. D. Ky. 1932); Ohio Sav. Bank & Trust Co.
v. Schneider, 202 Iowa 938, 211 N. W. 248 (1926). But see, Holcomb & Hoke Mfg.
Co. v. N. P. Dodge Co., 242 N.-W. 367 (Neb. 1932), where sucf a transaction was
considered a bailment. The court based its decision on General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Hupfer, cited supra note 15, apparently without realizing that the Hupfer
case involved a tripartite trust receipt.
33. The case of In re A. E. Fountain, Inc., 282 Fed. 816, 25 A. L. R. 319
(C. C. A. 2d, 1922) is representative of this type. The opinion by Judge Augustus
Hand is valuable reading.
34. There being only four Missouri cases, they will be discussed chronologically
by date of decision rather than by type.
35. 281 S. W. 134 (Mo. App. 1926).
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of the pioneering of other courts and indeed the opinion of the court indicates that
such was the case.
The facts before the court are not set out with sharp clarity, but it would
seem that a tripartite transaction was attempted, but apparently through a mis-
conception as to the proper use of trust receipts, the requisite technical nicety as to
the source of the financer's title was not observed with the result that, when the
case came before the court, the court passed on a bipartite transaction. The facts
were these. The Spalding Motor Co. delivered cars to the Dealer in Charleston,
Mo., who paid 15 per cent of the purchase price and executed a trust receipt in
the following language, "Received of Spalding Motor Co. . . . acting for Commer-
cial Acceptance Trust ... owner thereof ... one new motor vehicle ... " with the
usual provisions as to the rights and privileges with respect to the cars. Further,
the Dealer accepted a draft drawn by Spalding Motor to Commercial Acceptance
Trust for the balance of the purchase price. Subsequently, the Dealer mortgaged
the cars to the defendant Commercial Acceptance Trust brought replevin against
the defendant mortgagee, who had taken possession of thfe cars. The finance com-
pany cited and was relying on the earlier import cases sustaining the bank's security
title in the true tripartite transaction. The court rejected its claim and affirmed
the lower court's holding that the mortgagee should prevail. The court distinguished
the cited tripartite cases by pointing out that in the tripartite transaction the pos-
session and title to the goods was in the financing bank prior to the time the trust
receipts were executed by the borrowing importer and that deli~.ery of possession
of the goods from the bank to the importer did not transfer title to the goods;
whereas, in the case before the court, title had never been in Commercial Acceptance
Trust, but was in the Spalding Motor Co., when the dealer was given possession
p~ursuant to his trust receipt No instrument was executed by Spalding Motor Co.
to the Commercial Acceptance Trust whereby its title could be passed to the Ac-
ceptance Trust Hence, the court held that when Spalding Motor Co. delivered
the cars to the Dealer and received 15 per cent cash, title to the cars passed to the
dealer.
Viewed from the standpoint of the standard tripartite trust receipt hereinbefore
discussed, it is obvious that Commercial Acceptance Trust, in setting up the trans-
action so as to have a security title, failed to provide for an additional maneuver
whereby it would derive its title from the seller, the Spalding Motor Co., by bill
of sale or bill of lading. This essential element was attempted to be brought about
by having the Spalding Co. deliver possession to the Dealer, and by a bald statement
in the trust receipt transfer or put title in the Acceptance Trust. The court ruled
that the parties failed because they had not observed the ritual of having title pass
from the seller to the financing company. In the succeeding cases which have
come before the Missouri courts, this case has never been mentioned or cited.80
The court could have decided that the trust receipt conveyed title to C.A.T. and
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since it was not recorded as a chattel mortgage was void as against subsequent
mortgagees in good faith and without notice. However, the court rejects by neces-
sary inference that possibility, which has been the position of several courts, and
went along with the general holding in tripartite cases to the effect that the trust
receipt does not convey and does not purport to convey title.
The second case involving the applicability of the Missouri recording statutes
came to the Circuit Court of Appeals, Eight Circuit, from the District Court for
the Western District of Missouri, in In re Bell Motor Company in 1930.Yt There,
the Studebaker Co. shipped cars under contract with the Bell Motor Co. to Joplin,
Missouri, sending the bills of lading to a local bank. The bank, as agent for the
Industrial Acceptance Corporation, gave Bell Motor the bills of lading upon the
execution of a trust receipt. Bell Motor paid 20 per cent of the purchase price
and executed a note to Industrial Acceptance Corporation for the balance, payable
in 120 days. Bell Motor Co. fell into a precarious position financially, and the
Acceptance Corp. recorded its trust receipts some five days before the petition
was filed in involuntary bankruptcy. Industrial Acceptance Corp. filed its petition
to reclaim the cars, then in the hands of the trustee in bankruptcy. The referee
ruled that the transaction was essentially a conditional sale and. void as against
creditors because not filed as required by Missouri statute. The federal district
court reversed the ruling of the referee and on appeal, the court of appeals affirmed,
indicating that the trust receipt created a bailment or agency for sale. The court
placed emphasis on the fact that the trust receipt provided that any sale authorized
was "for the account of the Industrial Acceptance Corporation." That is, as the
court said, the money to be paid under the trust receipt was upon a sale of the
goods by the dealer, not upon a sale of the goods to the dealer.
It is to be noted at the outset that this case represents the true or tripartite
trust receipt transaction. Industrial Acceptance Corporation received its title to the
cars from the Studebaker Company, not from the Bell Motor Co. The Bell Motor
Co. received the bill of lading from the agent bank, only after executing the trust
receipt.
The court considered an assertion that the transaction was a conditional sale.
The court noted that were the transaction considered as being either a chattel
mortgage or a conditional sale, it would be subject to the applicable Missouri
recording statutes. The court does not say that the trust receipt is siti generis,
but, influenced by an earlier Nebraska case,"" calls the transaction one of bailment.
Two things weaken the case for future usefulness as sustaining the validity of
tripartite trust receipts without recording: first, the court relies on the wording of
the trust receipt as being that appropriate to bailment, and not on the dissimilarities
between the transaction and that of a chattel mortgage and a conditional sale
and, second, by additional remarks made by the court at page 24 of 45 F. (2d):
37. In re Bell Motor Co., Craig v. Industrial Acceptance Corp., 45 F. (2d)
19 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930), cert. denied 283 U. S. 832, 51 Sup. Ct. 365 (1931), sub 'nom
Craig v. Industrial Finance Corp.
38. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hupfer, cited sitpra note 15,
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"But there is another fatal weakness in appellant's contention. Even if these
trust receipts should be construed to be in the nature of conditional sale contracts,
and hence under the Missouri law, subject to the recording statute above quoted,
still the instruments were valid as between the parties and as to all the world
except creditors during the time they were withheld from record [citations omitted].
In the instant case there was no claim in the lower court that these instruments
were void because credit had been extended to the bankrupt by others while they
were withheld from record, nor was there any proof that there were any such sub-
sequent creditors. The instruments were filed for record before the adjudication
in bankruptcy, and the trustee took the property of the bankrupt subject to all
liens or claims against it at the time of the filing of the petition. . .."39
In sustaining the tripartite trust receipt transaction without recordation the
court was in line with the largest commercial states. While it seems that the com-
mercial utility of the trust receipt justifies the decision, it should be pointed out
that the position that the trust receipt creates a bailment is open to criticism.
Professor Vold has, with copious citations of authority, forcibly demonstrated that
the bailment analysis will not accord with the rights of the parties as set forth
in the trust receipt and as enforced by the courts. 40 He points out that the dealer
is more than a bailee, because it is he who has the substantial beneficial owner-
ship of the goods held under the trust receipt. The dealer has the power to ex-
tinguish-.the security interest of the financing house by tendering the amount
advanced on the goods. Thus, if the goods increase in value it is he who reaps
the profit. He can transfer his interest in the goods subject to the security interest
of the financing agency. If the financing agency repossesses the goods and resells
them, the dealer is entitled to any balance in excess of what was due the finance
house. Likewise, it is the dealer who has the risk of the venture. If the goods are
destroyed, depreciate in value, or are stolen or lost, it is he who suffers the loss.
In any event the dealer must still pay the financing house irrespective of what
happens to the goods. Upon retaking and resale the dealer is personally liable for
any deficiency. Hence, it is obvious that the dealer is more than a bailee. He is
the substantial owner. On the other hand the financing agency is not a true bailor
for it has only a security interest or title in the goods.
The next case, Gardner Motor Co. v. Globe Securities Co., 41 came to the
Missouri Supreme Court in 1935. The Gardner Motor Co., a St. Louis manufacturer
of automobiles had shipped five cars to its local dealei in Kansas City. It had
consigned the cars to itself with instructions to notify its dealer, The bills of lading,
invoices and trust receipts had been sent to a local bank which delivered the bill
of lading to the dealer upon the execution of the trust receipt by the dealer.
The dealer subsequently mortgaged the cars to Globe Securities Co. The mortgage,
which had been duly recorded, provided that the mortgagee, upon default, could
39. In re Bell Motor Co., 45 F. (2d) 19, 24 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930), supra note
37.
40. VOLD, SALES, § 112, p. 352-353.
41. 337 Mo. 177, 85 S. W. (2d) 651 (1935).
[Vol. 112
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take possession of an sell the cars for the amount of the indebtedness. When the
dealer defaulted, Gardner Motor, learning for the first time of the mortgages,
asserted its right to absolute ownership and title by repossessing them. Globe
Securities Co. then brought an action of trover against Gardner Motors Co. Globe
Securities Co. argued that the trust receipts constituted either a chattel mortgage
or a conditional sale. Gardner Motors argued that the cars were only on con-
signment, title always remaining in it, that the relation was that of factor and
principal, and that the dealer-factor had no right to mortgage the cars. Held,
the transaction was a consignment for sale.
This was another bipartite transaction. And it is important to note that
in this case the dealer signed no note nor accepted a draft whereby it was under
any obligation to pay for the cars at any time. Judge Hays in his opinion pointed
out that a chattel mortgage can exist only where the mortgagor has title which
it can convey to the mortgagee as security. So here, where at no time had the
bill of lading gone into the hands of the dealer until the trust receipt had been
executed, the dealer had no title which could be conveyed by way of mortgage
or deed of trust. And he points out that in a contract for conditional sale beneficial
ownership is given, title to pass at a future time, the conditional vendee assuming
an absolute obligation to pay for the property. The trust receipt provided that
the dealer agreed "to store, warehouse and hold the automobiles in trust for the
said Gardner Motor Co., Inc., as its property, and to return same on demand...
but with liberty to exhibit and sell same for cash for "a specified sum" for the
account of said Gardner Motor Co., and in event of sale to pay over immediately
to Gardner Motor Co., the sum specified above . . ." From the terms of the trust
receipt the court concluded that the dealer was under no obligation either to pay
or to secure a purchase price, nor that any title had passed to the dealer to support
a chattel mortgage back. Nor did the trust receipts contemplate that title should
pass at a later time. Title was to pass only if and when a sale was made, and
then to pass directly from Gardner Motor to the customer. Since it was neither
a chattel mortgage nor a conditional sale, the court concluded that it created an
agency or bailment for sale and no recordation was necessary. And further, that
since Missouri follows the common law rule that a factor authorized to sell can
not mortgage or pledge, the dealer had no authority to mortgage the cars to Globe
Securities Co.
Although this was a bipartite transaction and the court construed the trust
receipts as creating a bailment for sale, it should not be concluded as a general
proposition that the bipartite trust receipt does not have to be recorded to be
valid in Missouri. The weight of authority is that the bipartite -transaction
creates either a chattel mortgage or a conditional sale. The special circumstance
in the Gardner Motor Case-the fact that the dealer was under no obligation
to pay-makes it a special case. An attorney presented with a bipartite trust re-
ceipt case should feel justified and confident in bringing to the court's attention
the necessity for recordation under our statutes any transaction which falls into
the security pattern of the chattel mortgage or conditional sale.
13
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Commercial Credit Co. v. Interstate Securities Co.42 is the most recent pro-
nouncement of a Missouri court on the subject. The Dealer had an arrangement
with Commercial Credit whereby Commercial Credit agreed to finance the pur-
chase of cars from Chrysler on the "wholesale floor plan." When the Dealer de-
sired to purchase automobiles, it would order them from Chrysler. Commercial
Credit maintained an agent at the Chrysler plant, who would pay for the cars
so ordered and would take a bill of sale from Chrysler. That agent would forward
the bill of sale to Commercial Credit's local office in Kansas City. Chrysler, upon.
Commercial Credit's direction, shipped the cars directly to the Dealer and mailed
to it the invoices. The Dealer could either pay cash for the cars or execute a
trust receipt for them to the local office of Commercial Credit. Apparently the
Dealer at no time executed a note obligating him to pay for the cars. In 1935,
at the outset of its financing of the Dealer's purchases of automobiles, Commercial
Credit had obtained from the' Dealer a trust receipt executed in blank. The Dealer'
had also entered into a floor plan arrangement with Interstate Securities Co., which,
financed some of the Dealer's wholesale purchases and also financed some of the
Dealer's retail sales. It seems that the Dealer upon the receipt of the invoices.
would exhibit them to Interstate who would lend money on the cars, taking a
chattel mortgage. Twelve cars were involved in the controversy. Apparently
the Dealer upon the receipt of the cars had mortgaged them to Interstate and
as to five of them had not executed a trust receipt to Commercial Credit's local
agent. Thereupon Commercial Credit filled out the blank trust receipt executed'
by the Dealer some two years before, covering the five cars. The Dealer de-'
faulted, Interstate took the cars under the mortgage and sold them. Commercial
Credit claimed that it had retained title to the cars in question at all times, that the,
trust receipt did not constitute a chattel mortgage and was not required to be
recorded. Interstate Securities contended that the trust receipt constituted a secret
lien and that the trust receipt was not valid because not filled out in accordance!
with the intentions of the parties.
The court held that the Dealer had never gotten title to the cars for which
it had not paid cash. The invoice was the only paper passing into the hands;
of the dealer. Commercial Credit had title by bill of sale from Chrysler. The court
very properly remarked that "standing alone, an invoice is not regarded as evidence-
of title; it is as appropriate to a bailment as to a sale." Therefore; the court
held that the relationship was that of bailment for sale and that Commercial
Credit should prevail in its replevin action against the mortgagee. The decision
gives little helpful discussion of the trust receipt in Missouri, citing without dis-
cussion the Gardner Motor Co. case and In re Bell Motor Co. The court does not
indicate that it perceives any difference in the factual pattern presented in those
two Missouri cases. In the instant case there is a peculiar admixture of facts. The
transaction is essentially tripartite in character. However, the dealer executed
no note to Commercial Credit as is customary in the usual financing transaction
42. 197 S. W. (2d) 1000 (Mo. App. 1946).
I [Vol. 1
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utilizing trust receipts. Deciding as it does that a bailment was created by the
trust receipt this case is a springboard for a future decision that a bailment is
created in the tripartite transaction Where the dealer executes a note and obli-
gates himself to pay a definite sum.
What, if any, conclusions may be drawn from the Missouri cases?
Tripartite: The twig has been bent toward sustaining their validity without-
recording. The basis seems to be on a theory of bailme'nt, which is hard to sustain
and is certainly an inadequate statement of the relationship created by the trust
receipt.
Bipartite: While Missouri has not been confronted with bipartite transactions
of the nature set out above under "bipartite trust receipts," the case of Forgan
v. Bridges and the Gardner Motor Co. case indicate that the Missouri courts are
prepared to distinguish bipartite and tripartite transactions and in a proper case
will construe the bipartite transaction as either a bailment, a chattel mortgage
or conditional sale, depending upon the facts.
(3) If our economy is beset by a severe depression, it is safe to predict that
the trust receipt will come under fire. It is to be hoped, however, that the legis-
lature will adopt a middle ground, such as the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, to
save the usefulness of the trust receipt as a credit carrier.
JAMES P. BROWN
DISTINCTION BETWEEN EMPLOYEE AND INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR IN APPLICATION
OF SOCIAL SECURITY ACT TO ORCHESTRAS
The term "employee" is not defined in the federal Social Security Act.1 The
applicable treasury regulation provides that one is an employee if there exists
between him and the person for whom he performs services the legal relationship
of employer and employee2.
Divergent opinions have been expressed as to what factors are largely de-
terminative of whether one is an employee or independent contractor. Many
courts have announced right of control as the chief determinant. Other courts
1. 49 STAT. 642 (1935), 26 U. S. C. § 1607 (a) (1935).
2. Treasury Regulations 106, § 402.204; 107 id. § 403.204. The term "em-
ployee" is synonymous with the term "servant." The words "employer" and "em-
ployee" are now commonly used instead of the older terms "master" and "servant."
35 Am. Jur. 445.
The courts have differed as to whether the common law concept of the dis 2
tinction between an employee and independent contractor applies in cases arising
under the Social Security Act, or whether a broadened concept of the term "em-
ployment" is applicable to that act. Jones v. Goodson, 121 F. (2d) 176 (C. C. A.
10th, 1941), American Oil Co. v. Fly, 135 F. (2d) 491 (C. C. A. 5th, 1943), Texas
Co. v. Higgins, 118 F. (2d) 636 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), Anglim v. Empire Star Mines
Co., 129 F. (2d) 914 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942), and Indian Refining Co. v. Dallman,
31 F. Supp. 455 (S. D. Ill., 1940) apply the common law concept. United States
v. Vogue 145 F. (2d) 609 (C. C. A. 4th, 1944), and Grace v. Magruder, 148 F.
(2d) 679 (App. D. C., 1945) apply the broadened concept. For a discussion of
this development, see (1945) 14 FORDHAM L. REV. 252.
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consider right of control as being only one of several elements that are relevant
to this inquiry.3 The Restatement of Agency lists control over the manner of
doing the work as only one of nine factors to be considered in determining whether
one is a servant or independent contractor.
4
In a number of early cases concerning application to band leaders of pro-
visions of state unemployment compensation statutes, state courts held leaders of
;aame bands to be independent contractors and leaders of non-name bands to be
,employees. 5
The first case relating to liability of a band leader for federal social security
taxes on members of the band is that of Williams v. United States.0 The contract
,of employment incorporated by reference the by-laws and regulations of the
American Federation of Musicians, which prohibited sidemen from accepting en-
.gagements with establishments. The court stated that in the absence of a right
to employ and discharge members there could be no effective control. Since
the contract gave no right of control to the establishment, the leader was held
,to be an independent contractor.
The position of the court is somewhat confused by its reference to the sig-
.nificance of the leader's being engaged in an independent business for profit.
Although the court did not clearly indicate the extent to which it was influenced
by this latter factor, it is evident that it placed chief emphasis on right of control.
The same court later in Spillson v. SmitA9 said of the Williams case that the
.cuntrolling factor in that case was the absence of right of control.
After the Williams decision the American Federation of Musicians required
3. TIFFANY, PRINCIPAL AND AGENT (2d ed. 1924) 101-4. Courts which hold
-that right of control is the main determinant of the existence of an employer-em-
ployee relationship have on occasion interpreted facts as placing control in one who
in no real sense had control in order to attain a just result, indicating that they have
'been influenced by the presence of other elements. For a discussion of this practice
of the courts see (1920) 20 COL. L. Rsv. 335, where reference is made to the case
-of McNamara v. Leipzig, 227 N. Y. 291, 125 N. E. 244 (1919). It has been held
that the relationship of principal and agent may exist between a licensed pilot
and an unlicensed person for whom he operates an airplane, although the latter is
prohibited by statute from exercising any control over the manner of operation.
-United Air Lines Services, Ltd., v. Sampson, 30 C. A. (2d) 135, 86 P. (2d) 366
(1938).
4. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 220 (2).
5. The following cases held the leader to be an independent contractor. Hill
Hotel Co. v. Kinney, 138 Neb. 760, 295 N. W. 397 (1940); Unemployment Com-
pensation Commission v. Mathews, 56 Wyo. 479, 111 P. (2d) 111 (1941); In re
Amigone, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 15 (1941); In re Brown, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 330 (A pp.
Div., 3d Dep't, 1940); lI, re Earle, 262 App. Div. 789, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 310 (3d
Dep't, 1941). The following cases held the establishment to be the employer: Steel
.Pier Amusement Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 127 N. J. L.
154, 21 A. (2d) 767 (1941); Palumbo v. Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review, 148 Pa. Super. 289, 25 A. (2d) 80 (1942); In re Ajello, 19 N. Y. S.
(2d) 886 (App. Div., 3d Dep't, 1940). For a discussion of this distinction see
(1942) 36 ILL. L. REv. 586.
6. 126 F. (2d) 129 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942).
7. 147 F. (2d) 727 (C. C. A. 7th, 1945).
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all orchestras to use what was known as the "Form B" contract. This form pro-
vided that the establishment should have complete control of services of orchestra
members, and that the proprietor of the establishment authorized the leader on
his behalf to replace employees who failed to perform services provided for under
the contract.
In Birmingham v. Bartelss it was held that the provision in "Form B" relative
to control was conclusive of the existence of an employer-employee relationship
between the establishment and the leader. Previous decisions had been to the
effect that an express provision that the relationship of employer and employee
shall or shall not exist is not conclusive. 9 However, there would appear to be some
justification for distinguishing between the effect of the two provisions. Specific
provisions relative to factors characteristic of the employer-employee relationship
would be more clearly indicative of the intent of the parties than a more general
designation as to the relationship.
Although decisions of state courts are referred to, no specific mention is made
in the Williams, Spillson or Bartels case of the distinction made by state courts
between name and non-name bands. It would appear on the basis of the cases
in point that the federal courts do not recognize the validity of this distinction.
Indeed, there would seem to be no necessity for such a classification if a contractual
provision as to right of control is determinative of the employer-employee relation-
ship.
However, the propriety of applying the concept of the conclusiveness of right
of control, which developed in cases concerned with imposition of tort liability,
to the determination of liability under the Social Security Act may be seriously
questioned. It is conceivable that there may be some justification for the proposition
that the one possessing a right of control over a servant should exercise that
control in such a manner as to prevent the servant from committing torts against
third persons when acting within the scope of his employment. However, an excise
tax on employment is normally paid out of the profits of the business in connection
with which the employment occurs. The question is whose business is it? In
determining the answer to that question it would seem appropriate to take into
consideration all of the factors characteristic of a business enterprise, rather
than to limit the inquiry to the ascertainment of the existence or non-existence
of a right of control.
WILLIAM E. AULGUR
8. 157 F. (2d) '295 (C. C. A. 8th, 1946).
9. The cases of Robins Dry Dock and Repair Co. v. Navigazione Libera
Triestina and Moran Towing and Transportation Co., 261 N. Y. 455, 185 N. E.
698 (1933) and Williams v. United States, 126 F. (2d) 129 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942)
discuss the effect of an express provision that the relationship of employer and
employee shall exist. In Industrial Commission v. Northwestern Mutual Life In-
surance Co., 103 Colo. 550, 88 P. (2d) 560 (1939) and Matcovich vv. Anglim, 134 F.(2d) 834 (C. C. A. 9th, 1943) there were express provisions that the relationship
of employer and employee should not exist. In Vaughan v. Warner, 157 F. (2d)
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